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ABSTRACT
Towards Cooperating in Repeated Interactions Without Repeating
Structure
Huy Pham
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
A big challenge in artificial intelligence (AI) is creating autonomous agents that can
interact well with other agents over extended periods of time. Most previously developed
algorithms have been designed in the context of Repeated Games, environments in which the
agents interact in the same scenario repeatedly. However, in most real-world interactions,
relationships between people and autonomous agents consist of sequences of distinct encounters
with different incentives and payoff structures. Therefore, in this thesis, we consider Interaction
Games, which model interactions in which the scenario changes from encounter to encounter,
often in ways that are unanticipated by the players. For example, in Interaction Games, the
magnitude of payoffs as well as the structure of these payoffs can differ across encounters.
Unfortunately, while there have been many algorithms developed for Repeated Games, there
are no known algorithms for playing Interaction Games. Thus, we have developed two
different algorithms, augmented Fictitious Play (aFP) and augmented S# (Aug-S#), for
playing these games. These algorithms are designed to generalize Fictitious Play and S#
algorithms, which were previously created for Repeated Games, to the more general kinds
of scenarios modeled by Interaction Games. This thesis primarily focuses on the evaluation
of these algorithms. We first analyze the behavioral and performance properties of these
algorithms when associating with other autonomous algorithms. We then report on the
results of a user study in which these algorithms were paired with people in two different
Interaction Games. Our results show that while the generalized algorithms demonstrate many
of the same properties in Interaction Games as they do in Repeated Games, the complexity
of Interaction Games appear to alter the kinds of behaviors that are successful, particularly
in environments in which communication between players is not possible.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

As humans, we frequently interact with the same people over extended periods of
time, sometimes on a daily basis. These individual encounters are the building blocks of
human relationships. Social exchange theory [12] poses that every person gains and loses
something with every interaction. Researchers have tried to formalize these interactions
through different models. Games are one of the well-studied models of these interactions.
Many different game types have been created to model repeated interactions between
people and other intelligent entities. Repeated games and their variants, which have been
generalized as stochastic games [18], are perhaps the most frequently studied of these models.
These types of games can be used to study the long-term relationship between people and
machines. However, we find that no game type conveys the situation we want to study. In real
life, we do not always encounter the same situation repeatedly. For example, unanticipated
encounters occur frequently in many relationships. To have a thorough predictive model
of the scenarios likely to be encountered through the interaction may be costly and even
impossible. Thus, in this thesis, we present the concept of Interaction Games (IGs), which
are stochastic games in which the future game stages or rounds of interaction are unknown
and can change over time.
An interaction game (IG) is defined by a set of players I, who interact with each other
in a sequence of games G = (g1 , g2 , · · · , gT ). Here, gt defines the tth encounter of the players,
and T defines the number of rounds in the IG. Each game gt can be of any finite game form,
including a normal-form (matrix) game, an extensive-form game, or a finite stochastic game.
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Figure 1.1: Example IG with four rounds (stage games). In each round, the players play a
matrix game wherein the row player selects the row and the column player the column. The
resulting joint action identifies a cell in the matrix assigning payoffs to the row and column
players, respectively.

Regardless of game form, the outcome of gt is a vector of finite payoffs obtained by the players,
t
denoted by rt = (r1t , · · · , r|I|
), where rjt is the payoff to player j. For simplicity, we assume

that rewards are translated such that rjt ≥ 0, and all players rewards are scaled equivalently.
An illustrative IG of short duration is shown in Figure 1.1. The game illustrates
that players of IGs must deal with encounters having different equilibrium characteristics,
symmetry characteristics, and importance. Given that players do not know future stage
games, these characteristics make efficient cooperation in such interactions challenging.
The set of possible IGs is vast. Thus, as a starting point to studying IGs in this thesis,
we make several stipulations. First, we assume that each game gt is a two-player normal-form
game. Let A(gt ) = Ai (gt ) × A−i (gt ) be the set of joint actions in stage game gt , where Aj (gt )
is the action set of player j in game gt . Let rjgt (a) denote the reward received by player j
when the joint action a = (ai , a−i ), where ai ∈ Ai (gt ) and a−i ∈ A−i (gt ), is played in game
gt . Second, in each round, we assume that players know gt , and that they can observe the
actions taken by each other. Third, we assume that T is unknown to both players and is
likely large. Fourth, we assume that the choices made by the players in game gt have little or
no impact on subsequent stage games (gt+1 through gT ). Finally, at time t, gτ is unknown to
the players for all τ > t.
Because of the newness of IGs, there is no known algorithm capable of achieving
desirable results in this type of game. However, over the years, scientists have developed
2

many algorithms to increase the ability of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to interact with other
agents, including humans, in many other game settings. Thus, in this thesis, we will study
how well these approaches can be extended to IGs.
Specifically, in this these, we extended two known algorithms to IGs (Fictitious Play [2]
and S# [5]). We then evaluated the performance of these algorithms both via simulation and
via a user study. Our results showed that at least one of our algorithms was able to interact
effectively against other agents as well as humans in each setting we considered. Compared
to humans, our algorithms achieved similar results when interacting with another human in
this setting. Our extended version of S# performed as well as humans when communication
was allowed. On the other hand, our extended version of FP achieved similar payoffs to that
of humans when there was no communication. This research forms a basis for future research
in repeated interactions in which the scenario in which the players interact changes over time.

1.1

Thesis Statement

In this research, we are interested in constructing agents that can interact with other intelligent
agents in long-term interactions. We model these interactions as interaction games (IGs).
We generalize FP [2], Trigger Strategies [11], and S# [5], algorithms previously created for
repeated games (RGs), to IGs. We focus on evaluating and validating these algorithms
via simulations and a user study. We are interested in determining whether our extended
algorithms maintain the same performance attributes in IGs as the original algorithms have
in RGs. In particular, we hypothesize that the empirical distribution of actions played by aFP
(extended version of FP) in self play will converge to a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we
hypothesize that Aug-S# (our extended version of S#) will, like the original algorithm, both
(1) tend to minimize disappointment and (2) achieve cooperative solutions when associating
with people and other algorithms that are willing to cooperate in IGs.

3

Chapter 2
Related Work

In this proposed research, we will design and analyze algorithms in IGs. IGs are
designed to comply with our goal of studying and handling interactions in a series of timevarying, perhaps unexpected, encounters. In this section, we discuss how IGs relate to
other game forms designed to model extended interactions between players. We also review
algorithms that have been developed to solve similar types of games as well as the game
theory related to the subject.

2.1

Relationship to Other Games

Interaction games are closely related to other commonly studied games, including repeated
games and stochastic games.
2.1.1

Repeated Games (RGs)

IGs generalize RGs. An RG is an IG in which, for all t, gt+1 = gt . In words, in each round of
an RG, the players play the exact same game. Many algorithms have been developed for
playing RGs. However, because the payoff matrix can change from round to round in IGs,
these algorithms may not extend in a straight-forward fashion to IGs.
2.1.2

Stochastic Games

A stochastic game (SG) [18] is a tuple (S, A, T, R), where
• S is a set of states
4

• A = A1 xA2 x...xAn (Ai is a set of actions for player i)
• T is a transition function
• R is a reward or payoff function
In the case of two-player SG, the state transition is based on probabilities π(gt+1 |gt , ai , a−i ) in
which ai and a−i are actions of the players in round gt . SGs [17] can be used to model many
interactions in the real world. Nevertheless, the world is sufficiently unpredictable that it is
difficult to accurately assess the probability transitions between states. Therefore, IGs were
designed as a form of SGs in which unpredictable or unknown future events produce a new
game gt+1 . Therefore, unlike in regular SGs, the new payoff structure gt is generated prior to
each round of an IG that is not based on some previously known probability distribution
function.

2.2

Solution Concepts for Interaction Games

In this section, we will discuss several solution concepts for other related game types to IGs.
These solution concepts has been used and studied repeatedly by different researcher for
these type of games. These concept will be the basic ideas in building algorithms for IGs.
2.2.1

Maximin Strategy

In repeated games, the maximin value [19] is the maximum expected payoff that a player can
guarantee itself regardless of the action of its opponent. An agent should play this strategy
when it believes its associate will act counter to its desires. The maximin value is formally
defined as
vimm (gt ) = max

min

πi ∈Πi (gt ) π−i ∈Π−i (gt )

rigt (πi , π−i )

(2.1)

where Πj (gt ) is the set of legal probability distributions over player j’s action set in gt , and
rigt (πi , π−i ) is the expected payoff to player i when the players play strategies πi and π−i ,
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respectively. The player’s maximin strategy is the strategy it plays in this solution, given by:
πimm (gt ) = arg max

min

πi ∈Πi (gt ) π−i ∈Π−i (gt )

2.2.2

rigt (πi , π−i )

(2.2)

The Attack Strategy

When a player desires to punish its partner, it uses its attack strategy, or the strategy that
minimizes its partner’s payoffs in a stage game. This strategy is given as follows:
πiattack (gt ) = arg min

max

πi ∈Πi (gt ) π−i ∈Π−i (gt )

2.2.3

gt
r−i
(πi , π−i )

(2.3)

Nash Bargaining Solution

The goal of our algorithm is not to receive more reward than the agents which it interact
with, but to maximize its own reward. To accomplish such a task, we have to clearly define
a benchmark in which we can compare our result with. We use John Nash’s Bargaining
Solution [15] as our desired result. The Nash Bargaining solution guarantees four axioms:
• Invariant to affine transformations or Invariant to equivalent utility representations
• Pareto optimality
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Symmetry
N BS
In other words, Nash Bargaining Solutions (viN BS , v−i
) are the results of the following

optimization problem:
t
mm
(rit − vimm )(r−i
− v−i
)
max
t t

ri ,r−i

(2.4)

t
mm
subject to : (rit , r−i
) > (vimm , v−i
)

6

2.3

Algorithms for Playing Games

There have been many algorithms developed to solve different types of games. Nevertheless,
repeated games have the closest relationship to interaction games. Hence, we will focus on the
strategies developed to solve repeated games. For RGs itself, there are many different types of
algorithms such as: tit-for-tat, Fictitious Play [10], multi-agent reinforcement learning (e.g.,
Minimax-Q [14], WoLF [1], M-Qubed [7], LOLA [9]), leader strategies (Bully, Godfather) [13],
trigger strategies, etc. In this proposed research, we study how generalized version of three
algorithms perform in IGs. These three algorithms are Fictitious Play, Trigger Strategies
[11], and S# [5]. Thus, in this section, we briefly discuss these three algorithms.
2.3.1

Fictitious Play

One of the oldest and most studied algorithms for RGs is Fictitious Play (FP) [2, 10]. Despite
its simplicity, FP performs relatively well in RGs. For example, in a recent simulation, FP
ranked sixth among 25 algorithms [5]. FP, however, has a weakness. It tries to maximize
its current payoff without considering the long-term effect of its action on the opponent.
Therefore, FP often does not reach Pareto optimal payoffs.
The idea behind FP (Alg 1) is simple. The algorithm models its opponent based on
the empirical distribution of the actions of its opponent. With the initial κ0 (a−i ) = 1, the
estimated probability of each action for the opponent at round t is:

γ t (a−i ) = P

κt (a−i )
t ′
a′ ∈A−i (g) κ (a )

(2.5)

After that, the algorithm plays the best response to the most frequent or the highest probability
actions. It is a greedy approach. FP then computes κt+1 (a−i ) for each a−i ∈ A−i (g) given
κt (a−i ) and its observation of its partner’s action at−i . The process is then repeated for the
next round.

7

Algorithm 1 Fictitious Play for player i for RGs.
Input: Game matrix g
Initialize: t ← 0; κ0 (a−i ) ← 1 for all a−i ∈ A−i (g)
repeat
- For all a−i ∈ A−i (g), compute γ t (a−i ) using Eq. (2.5)
- Select action ati ∈ brig (γ t )
- Observe partner’s action at−i
- For all a−i ∈ A−i (g), compute
(
κt (a−i ) + 1 if a−i = at−i
κt+1 (a−i ) ←
κt (a−i )
otherwise

(2.6)

- t←t+1
until Game Over
2.3.2

Trigger Strategies

A trigger strategy [11] for RGs is defined by two elements: an offer and a punishment. The
offer is a proposal from one player to another in which each player will follow a particular
pattern of actions throughout the game. If the other player does not follow the agreement,
the agent then applies the punishment forever or until the game reaches a specific condition.
The Folk Theorem states that pairs of trigger strategies can be used to generate an infinite
number of Nash equilibria in many repeated games [11].
2.3.3

S#

S# [5] and the communicating version of exploration-exploitation experts method (EEE
[8]), EEE# [16] are two algorithms which have done well with repeated games. In a recent
comparison, S# performed a little better than EEE# in playing repeated games. Therefore,
we will take a deeper look into S#.
S# was designed for repeated games, and is an extension of the algorithm S++ [4].
S++ is a meta-algorithm that selects experts from a set of experts in an efficient way. Each
expert in the set is a strategy for repeated games on its own such as maximin, trigger strategies,

8

etc. Later, the algorithm was expanded to perform successfully in repeated stochastic game
[6].
S# is encoded with three components: aspiration level, potential, and communication.
Its aspiration level is the agent’s payoff goal for each round. Potential is the expected payoff
of each expert and is compared to the aspiration level. Communication gives S# the ability
to talk to other agents. Because of the importance of these attributes, we will explain them
more clearly below.
Aspiration level The algorithm starts with an aspiration level or a payoff goal. If the
payoff on the current round satisfies the aspiration level, S++ will keep using the current
expert. Otherwise, S++ would compile a new set of satisfying experts. The experts in the
satisfying set will have potentials value higher than the aspiration values. S++ will then
randomly select a new expert from this set to continue the game.
Potential Potential is the highest expected payoff that we can reasonably believe that the
expert will receive when the opponent plays a best response against its strategy. Formally, a
best response is the strategy that yields the a player its expected payoff given the strategy of
the other player. Thus, potential is defined as follows:

zit (φ) = µi (φ, br−i (φ)),

(2.7)

where br−i (φ) denotes player −i’s best response to the strategy φ played by player i.
Communication S# took its form when communication was added to S++. The algorithm
gained the ability to converse with its opponent. This component helped S# cooperate with
the other player by giving suggestion and intent of its future action in each round. This was
to be the key feature in the improvement of S++. When the other players followed S#’s
suggestion and cooperated, they received better payoff than they would have otherwise [5].
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Chapter 3
Augmented Algorithms for Interaction Games

Since S# has been shown to be successful in interacting with people and other
algorithms in Repeated Games [5], we generalize S# to interaction games and then evaluate
the extent to which it can effectively interact with people in IGs as it does in RGs. As the
first step towards generalization, we use strategies from other algorithms that will be used as
expert strategies for S#.
There are many strategies used in RGs. Some of the most common strategies and
solution concepts are maximin, minimax, and the best response. Besides these strategies,
we introduce a new set of experts for Aug-S#: Fair Offer, Bully Offers, Bullied Offers,
Pleaser, and Augmented Fictitious Play. However, we do not provide minute details for
these algorithms since the primary contribution of this thesis is the evaluation (not the
development) of these algorithms via simulation and user study.

3.1

Trigger Strategies

As discussed in the previous chapter, a trigger strategy consists of two parts: the offer and the
punishment. However, unlike the previous definition of trigger strategies in which punishment
continues forever once one deviates from the offer, our trigger strategies only punish until
a certain condition is met. We briefly overview each part of the trigger strategies in this
section.
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ρ=-1.0
ρ ∈ [-0.4,-0.3]
ρ ∈ [-0.2,0.0]
ρ ∈ [-0.9,-0.5]

ρ ∈ [0.1,0.2]

ρ ∈ [0.3,0.4]
ρ=0.6

ρ=0.5
ρ ∈ [0.7,0.9]

ρ=1.0

Figure 3.1: Payoff solutions for a given IGs. Black points represent all possible payoff solutions
for the IGs. Blue dashed lines is maximin values for each player. The green dot is the Nash
bargaining solution. The red points are solutions computed by the offers for different values
of rho

3.1.1

Offers

The offer in our trigger strategies focused on moving the average payoff toward a certain
point on the payoff convex hull using a ρ value. Figure 3.1 shows a sample set of payoff pairs
from a particular IG. According to the Folk Theorem [11], each payoff pair in which both
players get a payoff higher than its maxmin value (dashed blue line in the figure) can be
sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. We seek to compute offers within
this set that reside or or near the Pareto boundary. These offers are shown in red in the
figure, and are parameterized by the value ρ. When ρ = 0, the algorithm computes an offer
that tends to be near the Nash Bargaining Solution (the Fair Offer). ρ values greater than
0 produce offers that favor the row player. We call these offers Bully Offers. On the hand,
when ρ < 0, the offer favors the column player. We call these offers Bullied Offers. In this
thesis, we named our trigger strategy agents in according to its characteristic. For example,
if the ρ value = 0.4, we named the agent bully4. On the other hand, if the ρ value = −0.4,
we named the agent bullied4.
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3.1.2

Punishment

As in the trigger strategies defined for RGs, the punishment phase of our trigger strategies
for IGs is achieved by playing the attack strategy (Eq. 2.3). The attack or minimax strategy
must be played until the benefit obtained by player −i for deviating from the offer is more
than negated by the punishment. Formally, when player −i deviates from the offer, it accrues
t
t
t
guilt g−i = r−i
− rb−i
+ δ, where rb−i
is the payoff it should have received in the round had it

conformed with the offer, and δ > 0 is a constant value. In subsequent rounds, the guilt is
t
t
updated as follows: g−i = g−i + r−i
− r̂−i
. Once g−i ≤ 0, the punishment phase ends.

3.2

Pleaser

This algorithm is created as a counter to the trigger strategies. The algorithm assumes its
partner is playing a trigger strategy, and simply tries to learn from experience the ρ value
of the offer in this trigger strategy. It then follows the actions prescribed to it in this offer.
When communication is possible, the Pleaser strategy simply follows the solutions suggested
by is partner when such suggestions are available.

3.3

Augmented Fictitious Play

In IGs, the payoff matrix can be different in each round. Hence, modeling the frequency
of each action (the modeling mechanism used in FP) does not model the opponent very
well. The same strategy can result in different actions because the payoff for each action
pairs are not the same. Thus, rather than counting actions, our augmented version of FP
(call augmented FP, or aFP) counts the number of times the player’s partner conforms with
a high-level strategy that can be generalized across games. We used the seven high-level
strategies listed in Figure 3.2.
Using this modification, aFP (Algorithm 2) then follows FP in a straight-forward
fashion. First, the algorithm ranks each action in the game using each high-level strategy
12
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Figure 3.2: Rankings created by six high-level strategies σ for two different stage games.
Precise definitions of the high-level strategies are provided in Appendix A.
from a set Σ of high-level strategies. It then decides which high-level strategy best models
the opponent’s strategy, given by
σ ∗ = arg max ctσ (1)

(3.1)

σ∈Σ

where ctσ (k) is the number of times that σ’s k th -ranked action has been played up to round t.
Finally, aFP will play the action associate with the best response strategy to the modeled
opponent’s strategy.
To create action mappings across stages, each high-level strategy σ ∈ Σ orders its
partner’s actions in each round with respect to the quality of that action as measured by the
utility function of the high-level strategy. Let Γgσt (a−i ) denote the rank of action a−i in stage
game gt as determined by high-level strategy σ. The action orderings made by each σ ∈ Σ
equate actions across the stage games of the IG. For example, in the scenario presented in
Figure 3.2, the high-level strategy Safe equates action d in stage game gk with action h in
g

k+1
k
(d) = ΓSafe
(h)). On
stage game gk+1 since it gives those actions the same rank (i.e., ΓgSafe

the other hand, the high-level strategy Max Social Welfare equates action d with action h
because it orders the actions differently than Safe.
Recall that, in FP, κ represents the number of times an action is played. For each
a−i ∈ A−i (gt ), we then have
κt (a−i ) = 1 + ctσ∗ (Γgσt∗ (a−i )) ,
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(3.2)

Algorithm 2 Augmented Fictitious Play (aFP) for player i.
Input: G = (g0 , · · · , gT )
Initialize: t ← 0; c0σ (k) ← 0 for all k ∈ [1, N ], σ
repeat
- For all a−i ∈ A−i (gt ), compute κt (a−i ) using Eq. (3.3)
- For all a−i ∈ A−i (gt ), compute γ t (a−i ) using Eq. (2.5)
- Select action ati ∈ brigt (γ t )
- Observe partner’s action at−i
- For all σ and a−i ∈ A−i (gt ), compute
(
ctσ (x) + 1 if x = at−i
ct+1
(x)
←
σ
ctσ (x)
otherwise

(3.4)

where x = Γgσt (a−i )
- t←t+1
until Game Over (when t > T )

where 1 is added to the quantity as a prior, so that κ0 (a−i ) = 1 (as in FP; see Algorithm 1).
In Eq. (3.2), we assumed that the number of actions available to player −i is the
same in each round. Since this is not always true, we can adjust the counts to represent how
frequently they are played when available as follows:

t

κ (a−i ) = 1 +

ctσ∗ (Γgσt∗ (a−i ))



t−1
t
Z (Γgσt∗ (a−i ))



(3.3)

where Z t (Γgσt∗ (a−i )) is the number of stage games up to round t in which player −i has had
at least Γgσt∗ (a−i ) actions in its action set.
When aFP is used as expert for Aug-S#, its potential is calculated as followed

zit (aF P )

=

t
X
τ =0

3.4

max Ugt (a)

a∈Ai (gt )

(3.5)

Augmented-S#

We begin by detailing the generalized version of S#, called Augmented-S# or Aug-S#, which
is overviewed in Algorithm 3. Since many of the algorithmic mechanisms of S# rely on
14

the same game being played repeatedly by the players, we must modify these algorithmic
mechanisms so that they can be used in IGs. In modifying these algorithmic mechanism, we
must ensure that they maintain the important properties that make S# successful. Thus,
in RGs, the Aug-S# algorithm behaves nearly identically to S# while also being able to
implement the same principles of behavior in IGs.
Our generalization of S# is achieved by making changes to both S#’s mechanism for
selecting which of its experts to follow and the experts themselves. We describe changes to
each of these elements of the algorithm in turn in the following two subsection.
3.4.1

Selection Mechanism

Aug-S#’s selection mechanism is similar to the selection mechanism of the original algorithm,
and operates as follows. First, it encodes (and learns) an aspiration level that the agent will
aim to achieve each round. Second, Aug-S# calculates a potential for each expert. If an
expert’s potential is higher than the aspiration level, then Aug-S# will consider selecting
that expert (it is placed in the set of satisficing experts from with the algorithm selects which
expert to follow). Third, the algorithm selects an expert from the set of satisficing experts.
Fourth, the algorithm then follows this expert for τ rounds. τ is a parameter defined by
the algorithm designer. Fifth, the algorithm calculates the ratio of the difference between
the total aspiration and the total maximin value up to round t over the difference between
the total NBS value and the total maximin value up to round t. If this value is more than
epsilon less than that of the previous cycle, the algorithm selects a new expert from the set of
satisficing experts using an e-greedy function (a departure from the original S++ algorithm
for repeated games). Afterward, we repeat step four and five until the game is over.
Since the payoff matrices in IGs change every stage, we must modify the algorithm so
that it can account for these changes in its selection mechanism. The following two changes
are required so that algorithm maintains its same function in IGs as it uses in RGs:
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1. Aspiration level – This is the value that Aug-S# will aim to achieve, on average, each
round. The aspiration level should fulfill two characteristics: initially optimistic and
converge to the average reward received in the long term (long-term accuracy). In the
original algorithm, the initial aspiration level is typically set high, either at the highest
payoff of the stage game or at the stage game’s Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). It is
then updated each round as a convex combination of the previous aspiration level and
the reward received in the latest round. However, given that the NBS of each round of
an IG is distinct, this mechanism does not guarantee that the aspiration level will be
set optimistically, nor does it permit the aspiration level to be compared against values
of an individual round (since each round is scaled differently). Thus, Aug-S# defines
its aspiration level differently, but with the intent to still maintain the properties of (a)
initial optimism and (b) long-term accuracy. Aug-S#’s aspiration level is defined as
follows:

αi (t) = ωViNBS (t) + (1 − ω)R̄(t),

(3.6)

where is R̄(t) the average payoff obtained by player i up to game t, given by R̄(t) =
Pt−1 τ
1
NBS
(t) is the average NBS of each round up to time t. ω is decreased
τ =1 ri , and Vi
t−1

over time such that in early rounds ViNBS (t) dominates and in later rounds R̄ has more

weight.
Algorithm, it is sometimes useful to use a normalized version of the aspiration level,
which we define as
αi′ (t) =

αi (t)
.
ViNBS (t)

(3.7)

2. Potential of experts – Aug-S# uses an estimate of the potentials of its experts to
determine whether each expert could potentially produce a payoff that meets its
aspiration level. Therefore, the potential of experts needs to be comparable to the
aspiration level. Since the values of each round can vary substantially from round
16

to round in an IG, we must modify these potentials so that they are comparable to
the aspiration level as given in Eq. 3.6. To do this, we compute the potential of each
expert ek as a summation of Viek (gt ) (the value of expert ek in game gt under ideal
circumstances) over all games played in the interaction so far. Formally,
t−1

1 X ek
ρk (t) =
V (gj ).
t − 1 j=1 i

(3.8)

Since α(t) and ρk (t) are both computed over the same set of games, the two are
comparable. Hence, we can always compare an expert’s potential with the aspiration
level at any time t.
3. Expert selection - After using an expert for τ rounds, Aug-S# evaluates the effectiveness
of the expert. As in the original algorithm, Aug-S# continues to play its current expert
when its rewards meet its aspiration level. Otherwise, it selects a new expert from the
satisficing set of experts E(t) using an ε-greedy function. With probability r =

1
t
2+ 100

is

used to decide if the method should choose greedily or just pick a random expert from
E(t). To choose greedily, the algorithm chooses its next expert from E(t) that has had
the highest productivity when used in the past. Here, we define productivity as:

pe (t) =

Re (t)
,
Vi′N BS (t)

(3.9)

where Re (t) is the total payoff of expert e in the rounds in which it was used up to time
t and Vi′N BS (t) is the NBS value for player i in those rounds. Eq. (3.10) in Algorithm 3
summarizes this expert-selection mechanism.
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Algorithm 3 Aug-S#
Input: Game G and set of experts E = {e1 , · · · , en }
Initialize: t ← 1; r̄(1) ← 0; α ← ViNBS (1)
repeat
Update potential ρk (t) of each expert ek ∈ E (Eq. 3.8)
Compute E(t) = {ek ∈ E : ρk (t) ≥ α(t)}
Select e(t) from E(t) using
(
e(t − τ )
if αi′ (t) is non-decreasing
e(t) =
ε-greedy selection based on pe (t) otherwise
Select action using e(t) for τ rounds;
t←t+τ
Compute α(t) (Eq. 3.6)
until Game Over
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(3.10)

Chapter 4
Performance and Behavioral Attributes of the Algorithms in Simulation

In this thesis, we seek to evaluate the extent to which the augmented algorithms
overviewed in the previous chapter maintain the same characteristics in IGs that the original
algorithms hold in RGs. A list of important attributes for these algorithms are show in
Table 4.1. We evaluate whether our augmented algorithms maintain these properties via a
set of simulations (reported in this chapter) and via a user study (reported in the subsequent
two chapters).
For the simulation results presented in this chapter, we first describe a set of games in
which we evaluate the algorithms. We then report the results of various simulations in the
game environments to evaluate the performance attributes of each algorithm in IGs.
Algorithms

Expected Behavior
- The empirical distribution of actions in self play converges
aFP
to a NE. (P1)
- Learn to play best response against people. (P2)
Trigger Strategies - Offers are NE of the repeated game and are near the Pareto
boundary. (P3)
- Obtain low disappointment when associating with many other
Aug-S#
algorithms. (P4)
- Obtain payoffs near the NBS value in self-play. (P5)
- Achieve cooperative solutions when playing with people who
are willing to cooperate. (P6)
Table 4.1: Expected behavior attributes of generalized algorithms in IGs
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Figure 4.1: Example normal-form games from each payoff family as classified by Bruns [3].
The highlighted solutions are the pure-strategy one-shot NE of each game.

4.1

Game Testbed

Since IGs have not been studied in prior work, we constructed a game testbed on which
to evaluate algorithms. This game testbed consists of two forms of games. The first set of
games are created by randomly generating a separate normal-form game for each round of the
interaction (interactions of 100 rounds and 1000 rounds are considered). On the other hand,
the second set of games are generated such that the players play a 2-action normal-form
game in each round randomly generated to conform to a particular payoff family. These
payoff families were categorized by Bruns with respect to the equilibrium characteristics of
the game [3]. Thus, by testing the algorithms in games with each payoff family, we are able to
observe how the payoff structures in and across interaction games impact the behaviors and
performances of algorithms. A more detail explanation of these game families is presented
below.
In the second set of games, each round’s game was generated by randomly selecting a
payoff structure from the specified payoff family. In these payoff structures, numbers represent
the ordinal preference ratings of the players, with 1 being the lowest preference and 4 being
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the highest preference. Figure 4.1 shows example payoff structure from each payoff family,
each of which has different equilibrium characteristics. Once the payoff structure is selected,
four randomly generated numbers in the range 0 to 100 are chosen. We then replace the
preferences in the payoff structure with the random number in increasing order, such that 1
would be replaced by the lowest generated number and so on. In this way, the players must
solve a different game in each round with distinct scales and equilibrium attributes.
In this way, we generated eight different categories of games. In seven of these
categories of games, each round’s game was generated from a payoff structure drawn from
the same payoff family. In the eighth category, the game played in each round was randomly
generated from all payoff structures.
A brief overview of each payoff family is as follows:
• Win-win games have a equilibrium solution that would give both players the highest
possible payoff. For example, if the row player chooses to play A and the column player
chooses to play Y, they would both receive 4 which is the highest payoff for both of
them.
• Biased games have a equilibrium solution that would give one player the highest
possible payoff while the other receives the second best payoff. For example, if the row
player chooses to play B and the column player chooses to play Y, the row player would
receive 4 and the column player only gains 3.
• Second Best games have a equilibrium solution that would give both players the
second highest possible payoff. For example, if row player chooses to play B and column
player chooses to play X, they would both receive 3 which is the second highest payoff
for both of them.
• Unfair games have one equilibrium solution that would give a player the highest
possible payoff while the other receives the third best payoff. For example, if the row
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player chooses to play B and the column player chooses to play Y, the row player would
receive 4 and the column player only gets 2.
• Traps games have a equilibrium solution which are Pareto Dominated by the solution
in which both players play the other action. The equilibrium solution in our example is
3,2 which is Pareto dominated by 4,3 (the results when both players choose different
actions).
• Sad games have an equilibrium solution which gives a player a second best payoff and
the other the second worst payoff. In our example, when the row player chooses B and
the column player chooses X. The row player receives 3 which is the second best payoff
while the col players receive the second worst payoff of 2.
• Cyclic game type has no pure Nash Equilibrium solution. That means for any action
pair, one of the players would want to move unilaterally to get a better payoff. In our
example game, if row player chooses A and column chooses X, row player would want
to change the action to B unilaterally to receive the better payoff of 2 instead of 1.
That applies to one of the players for any solution in our example game.
50 games of each type were generated for both 100-round and 1000-round interactions,
respectively. In short, the random games of different sizes (numbers of actions) are used
to see how well the algorithms scale to more complex scenarios. On the other hand, more
structured IGs based on Bruns’ payoff families are designed to study how well the algorithms
adapt to different payoff structures.

4.2

Trigger Strategies

The qualities of the offers produced by the various trigger strategies are critical to the ability
of Aug-S# to achieve cooperative solutions in self play and when associating with other
people. As specified in Table 4.1, these offers should give both players greater than their
maximin values. Ideally, they should produce payoffs on or near the Pareto frontier (Property
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Figure 4.2: Average payoffs achieved by aFP, Fair (ρ = 0) and Bully (ρ = 0.5) in self play in
IGs with stage games drawn from Bruns’s payoff families [3]. Global NBS is the NBS of all
the possible payoff combinations throughout the IG. Stage NBS is the average NBS value of
all stage game.

P3). Given that the quality of these offers are evaluated simultaneously with Aug-S#, we do
not evaluate them in detail alone. However, Figure 3.1 illustrates that the algorithm achieves
these characteristics in a single IG. Figure 4.2 also illustrates that the Fair offer (ρ = 0.0)
produces payoffs essentially equivalent to the NBS value of the game across a broad range of
games, while a Bully strategy ρ = 0.5 can potentially provide a player with an even higher
payoff (contingent on the other player also conforming with this offer).

4.3

Augmented Fictitious Play (aFP)

We analyze the ability of aFP to learn to play a best response in self play (Property P1) in
the 100-round IGs in which each stage game consisted of a 2x2 normal-form game conforming
with each of the eight categories of games described earlier.
Figure 4.3 (left) shows the average payoff obtained by aFP in self play compared
with four baseline solutions in the structured 2x2 IGs. aFP’s payoffs are always higher than
the average maximin value of the stage games, but always lower than the Nash bargaining
solution (NBS) [15]. Additionally, aFP’s average payoffs are typically between the average
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Figure 4.3: (Left) Average payoffs obtained per round by aFP in self play in IGs of various
types. aFP’s performance is compared with the average values from the stage games of
(1) the maximin value, (2) the lowest NE, (3) the highest NE, and (4) the Nash bargaining
solution [15] of the stage games. Results are averaged over 50 IGs each. Error bars show
the standard error of the mean. (Right) The percentage of rounds that aFP played a best
response in self to the action played by its partner.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of rounds in which aFP played a best response to its partner’s action
in self play. Error bars (although negligible) show the standard error of the mean.

lowest-valued and highest-valued NEs. These results are driven by its aFP’s tendency to
quickly learn to play a best response to its partner’s actions (Figure 4.3 right)1 .
In addition to these structured IGs with 2x2 stage games, we also desired to observe
how aFP’s performance scales to IGs with stage games that have more actions, as well as
games in which the number of actions varied from round to round. Thus, we also evaluated
this algorithm in self play in the randomly generated games of different sizes. These results
are shown in Figure 4.4. When the number of actions was extended beyond two in IGs, aFP
played best response less frequently compared to how often FP played the best response
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in RGs. However, these results are not surprising because (1) RGs create an unchanged
environment for agents to model each other and (2) FP is not guaranteed to converge to NE.

4.4
4.4.1

Augmented-S#
Disappointment

Recall that S++ is an expert algorithm that, in each round, selects an expert to follow
in the round from a set of experts Φi . Crandall [4] showed that S++ (and hence S#)
typically performs in RGs nearly as well as its best expert would have performed in the same
circumstances. This concept is known as disappointment. Formally, a player’s disappointment
up through round T is defined as follows:

DiT

= max
φ∈Φi

T
X

t
uti (φ, π−i
)

−

t=1

T
X

mi (at ),

(4.1)

t=1

t
where φ ∈ Φi and π−i
is a policy that agent −i would have played if agent i continued using

expert φ. uit represent the utility of agent i at time t and mi (at ) is the actual payoff of agent
i at time t. The average disappointment of agent i up to time T is:

D̂iT =

DiT
T

(4.2)

As defined in earlier work by Crandall et al. [4], an agent is said to have no disappointment
if
lim D̂iT ≤ 0

T →∞

(4.3)

We hold that Aug-S# should likewise demonstrate the same characteristic (Property
P4). Thus, we conducted a set of simulations in IGs to determine whether this held true.
Results averaged over a set of IGs with mixed payoffs (since these games consist of different
1

Cyclic games have no pure-strategy NE. As such it is not possible for both players to play a best response
to each others actions. This primarily accounts for the reduced percentage of best responses in the Cyclic
and Mixed games.
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types of games) are shown in Figure 4.5. These results are encouraging as they demonstrate
similar performance characteristics (in terms of disappointment) as S++ was shown to have
in RGs [4]. In the majority of cases, the disappointment values decrease or converge within
1000 rounds.
4.4.2

Comparing to the Nash Bargaining Solution

In order to observe Aug-S# cooperation in self-play, we compared the average payoff values
of Aug-S# with the NBS values (Property P5). Figure 4.6 shows that when cheap talk was
possible, Aug-S#’s average payoffs tend to approach the NBS values of two IGs used in
the user study described in the next chapter. This supported our prediction that Aug-S#
cooperated well with itself in cheap talk environment. While the values are slightly lower
without cheap talk (as is the case with S# in RGs) the algorithm still reaches high levels of
cooperation on average in such environments. In the next chapter, we describe a user study
comparing the ability of Aug-S#, aFP, and people to achieve cooperative solutions when
associating with people in these same two games.
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Figure 4.5: Aug-S#’s disappointment as a percentage of maximum payoff vs. different agents
in mixed games.
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Figure 4.6: The average payoff (as a percentage of the NBS) obtained by Aug-S# in self play
in the (left) Unfair and (right) Mixed games shown in the Appendix B.
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Chapter 5
User Study Design

In the previous chapter, we demonstrated via simulation that aFP and Aug-S#,
our extended versions of Fictitious Play and S#, respectively, tend to maintain the same
properties in many IGs as they do in RGs. Given that a primary desirable property of S#
is its ability to establish cooperative relationships with people in RGs, we evaluate in this
chapter whether or not Aug-S# maintains this property in IGs.
To identify the ability of Aug-S# to establish cooperative relationships with people
in IGs, we designed and conducted a user study1 involving 72 human participants. These
participants interacted with both Aug-S# and aFP in two different IGs. We describe this
user study in this chapter. The results of the user study are presented in Chapter 6.

5.1

Experimental Design

The purpose of this study was to test the effectiveness of aFP and Aug-S# when developing
relationships with a human partner in IGs when communication was both possible and
impossible. Thus, this study had two independent variables: partner (with factor levels
Human, Aug-S#, and aFP) and cheap talk (with factor levels Yes and No). When cheap talk
was possible, users were allowed to send a set of pre-specified messages to each other at the
beginning of each round.
1

The study was reviewed and approved by BYU IRB.
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User ID
1-4
5-8
9-12
13-16
17-20
21-24
25-28
29-32
33-36
37-40
41-44
45-48
49-52
53-56
57-60
61-64
65-68
69-72

Opponent for Game 1
Human
Aug-S#
Human
Aug-S#
aFP
Human
aFP
Aug-S#
aFP#
Human
Aug-S#
Human
Aug-S#
aFP
Human
aFP
Aug-S#
aFP#

Opponent for Game 2
Human
Aug-S#
Aug-S#
Human
aFP
aFP
Human
aFP
Aug-S#
Human
Aug-S#
Aug-S#
Human
aFP
aFP
Human
aFP
Aug-S#

Cheap Talk?
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 5.1: User Study Schedule

Each participant played two different games, and was randomly assigned two different
partners. Partner orderings were counter-balanced across participants as shown for all 72
participants in Table 5.1.
For each session, participants were assigned one of the four session ID numbers. In
the case of two humans playing with each other, the subject with the odd ID was the row
player, while the subject with the even ID was the column player. All subjects were row
players when playing against an algorithm. The condition of cheap talk or no cheap talk
was also assigned to each session. There were 9 sessions for each condition. Given that each
human-human interaction produces only a single data point, the study gave us 120 data
points in all over the 72 subjects. When the experiment ended, each participant received an
small amount of money to compensate for his or her participation. The amount was directly
correlated to the payoff each participant received in the game. The payoffs in each game
matrix were actually the amounts of cents a participant could receive.
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Majors
Counts
Mathematics/Statistics/Computer Science
33
Engineering
12
Other STEM majors
2
Business
6
Social Sciences and Humanities
11
Health related majors
7
Design
1
Table 5.2: Users’ majors information

As shown in Table 5.1, each session consisted of four human subjects. All participants
received training prior to playing the game (which was approximately 5 to 7 minutes in
duration) to make them familiar with the user interface (described in Section 5.3) and the
objectives of the game. Each participant was seated such that other participants’ screens were
not visible to them. Additionally, participants were requested to wear headphones throughout
the study to avoid any distractions and to listen to messages when available. All participants
started each game at the same time and were requested to remain quietly in their seats until
every participant completed the study. After each of the two games, the participants were
asked to fill out post-experimental questionnaires for that game (figure A.2 in Appendix A).
At the beginning of the user study, we also asked each of our participants to complete
a demographic questionnaire (figure A.1 in Appendix A). Most participants were college
students at BYU between the age of 18 to 27, with a mean age of 22.931 and a mode of 22.
They came from different backgrounds and majors (Table 5.2). However, the majority of
participants studied in STEM programs. 58.3% of the participants identified themselves as
male while the rest identified as female.
5.2

The Games

As described in the previous section, each human subject played two 50-round IGs, each with
a randomly selected partner (assigned according to the schedule in Table 5.1). In the first
game (Game 1), each round’s payoff matrix conformed with the payoff structure of unfair
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Figure 5.1: Two rounds in an unfair game. (Left) The payoff matrix in the first round.
(Right) The payoff matrix in the second round.

games as classified by Bruns [3]. In each round of this unfair game, one player had an unfair
advantage over the other player with respect to payoffs as is true of all game structures in
this payoff family. If one player got the best payoff, the other player would end up with the
second worst payoff. This advantage changes randomly between both players over rounds.
For example, Figure 5.1 shows 2 rounds of the unfair game. The (blue) numbers with
the bigger size were the payoffs of the row player while the (orange) numbers with the slightly
smaller size were the payoffs of the column player. The row player had options A and B. The
column player had option X and Y. In the first round, the column player had the advantage.
By simply play Y, this player would receive at least the second best payoff available to himself
or herself. This would force the other player to only either receive 0 or 12 which were not
very desirable in respect to what was available. In this case, the row player would be forced
to choose B and earned 12, the second worst payoff. The action pair B-Y was the one-shot
Nash equilibrium. However, we chose this game as part of user study because it gave the
players an interesting scenario.
Because the payoff matrix changed each round, it was not always in the player’s best
interest for him or her to rely on the unfair advantage or the one shot Nash equilibrium. If
both player chose to cooperate and played B-X in the first round and A-Y in the second
round, they would be better off than playing the one shot equilibrium in both round. The
row player would receive a total payoff of 55 and the column player would receive a total
payoff of 20 (instead of 51 and 16, respectively).

32

In the second IG (Game 2), the payoff orderings of the payoff matrices for each round
were randomly drawn from all types of payoff families identified by Bruns [3] which were
described in the previous chapter. In short, in this game, the players encountered different
situations in each round of the mixed game.
Each of these games was selected from the games generated and described in section
4.1. However, unlike those games, the chosen two games only had the first 50 rounds and
all the payoff values were cut in half so that the values directly corresponded to the cents
received by the players. We choose these two game because their payoff matrices vary in
values across all rounds. We predicted that they would be very interesting environments for
the user study. However, the study participants were not told in advance how many rounds
each game would last. The complete games are shown in Appendix B.

5.3

User Interface

Study participants played the IGs in the study on desktop computers. Two different user
interfaces were used depending on the communication condition assigned (cheap talk or no
cheap talk). When cheap talk was allowed, the messaging function of the user interface was
enabled (Figure 5.2). The participants were not given the messaging function when there was
no cheap talk (Figure 5.3). In both conditions, the participants could see the game matrix
and the actions available to them. They can also track the history of the game through a
table which contained the previous matrices, results, and messages if applied. The interface
automatically translated the payoff matrix such that all players viewed themselves as the row
player.
When cheap talk was enabled, at the beginning of each round, each player could send
a message to the other play by select one or more predefined speech acts. A player could also
choose not to send anything by clicking the button labeled “No message.” The option to
select an action was only available after both players had sent a message to the other player.
After both players had made their choice, the box in the matrix that represented action pairs
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Figure 5.2: User Interface provided to participants when cheap talk before each round was
enabled.

Figure 5.3: User Interface provided to participants when when cheap talk was disabled.

was highlight for a moment before the next round appeared. When there was no cheap talk,
this messaging functionality was not supplied.

5.4

Predefined Speech Acts

Participants were only permitted to communicate using a set of pre-determined phrases. This
set of phrases is shown in Figure 5.4. We tried to model these message after the previous
research by Crandall et al. [5]. However, because of differences between IGs and RGs, we
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Figure 5.4: Predefined speech acts participants could include in their messages in each round.

had to alter several messages. We also altered and added messages after receiving feedback
from people in pilot studies.
We hoped these messages would be able to help the players communicate their
intentions and feelings toward one another. Some of these messages could be used to
encourage one’s partner to cooperate, such as “Let’s cooperate.” Some messages allow the
players to clarify the intent of the player such as “Let’s play ...” or “I should get higher
payoff.” These messages also provide users with the means to express a range of emotions to
help the players communicate effectively and avoid misunderstandings.

5.5

Assessing Performance

We measured the performance of our algorithms by comparing them to (i) existing results
and (ii) results when humans played against each other in the same IGs. We chose the total
payoffs earned over the course of the game (normalized by the NBS value of the game) as our
primary performance measure.
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5.6

Hypotheses

With our understanding of the algorithms given the simulation results presented in the
previous chapter, along with findings in previous research [5], we made several predictions
for this study. Our hypotheses were that results would be similar to the results observied
in previous studies in RGs. We hypothesized that, when the other player was willing to
cooperate, the payoffs received by people and Aug-S# would be close to the NBS values.
Thus, when playing with another human, Aug-S# should generate payoffs that will be similar
or even better than those of two human players, and should tend to approach the NBS value
when cheap talk was possible. In an environment with cheap talk, the results should be
better overall because it should encourage and speed up cooperation. We also predicted that,
similar to self-play, Aug-S# would learn to cooperate with people quickly and would receive
the highest payoffs compared to other combinations (humans and aFP).
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Chapter 6
User Study Results – Interacting with People

Through the simulations reported in Chapter 4, we observed the characteristics and
performance attributes of our augmented algorithms when playing against other algorithms in
IGs. In this chapter, we further analyze these algorithms by observing their performance and
behavior when interacting with people in the user study described in the previous chapter.
We discuss the behavior of aFP and Aug-S# in these interactions with people separately,
beginning with aFP. We then compare the performance of Humans, Aug-S#, and aFP in self
play in the same two games used in the user study.

6.1

aFP converges to a best response when interacting with humans

Simulations reported in Chapter 4 showed that, in self play, aFP learned to play a best
response to the actions played by its partner in IGs in which each game gt had a pure Nash
equilibria. In this chapter, we evaluate the degree to which the algorithm also learned to
play a best response when interacting with people in the user study (Property P2).
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the average percentage of rounds that each algorithm type
played a best response to its human partner’s actions in each game with and without cheap
talk. Across all conditions, aFP typically played a best response about 90% or more of
the time, whereas Aug-S# and Humans played a best response to their partner’s action
only about 70% of the time on average. A three-way ANOVA, with game (Unfair, Mixed
Game), algorithm type (people, Aug-S#, aFP), and cheap talk (yes, no) as independent
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Figure 6.1: The average percentage of rounds in which the players played a best response
when paired with people in unfair game (left) with cheap talk and (right) without cheap talk.
The dots represent the average best response percentages of the player types and the lines
are error bars. The error bars reflect 95% confident intervals.

variables, validated this trend. This analysis found a significant effect for algorithm type
(F (2, 108) = 126.81, p < 0.001), but not game (F (1, 108) = 0.56, p = 0.454) or cheap talk
(F (1, 108) = 0.06, p = 0.803). Tukey pairwise comparisons between each type show that aFP
played a best response more than both Aug-S# (p = 0.001) and Humans (p = 0.001). There
was no statistical difference between Aug-S# and Humans (p = 0.458). These results are
shown in figure 6.3.
aFP’s best response percentage were higher than those of humans and Aug-S# in this
user study. However, we wanted to find out if their rate of playing a best response when
paired with people in the user study was comparable to our findings in simulation. Therefore,
we proceeded to compare the best response percentages of aFP in the user study with those
of aFP in self-play. Thus, we had aFP played against itself 50 times for each of the two games.
The average percentages of aFP’s best response actions in these simuations and in the user
study are shown in Figure 6.4. The figure shows similar rates of best response in both games
under both conditions. In terms of best response, aFP performed similarly against human as
it did against itself. We concluded that aFP did achieve its desired properties of converging
to a best response when interacting with people.
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Figure 6.2: The average percentage of rounds in which the players played a best response
when paired with people in mixed game (left) with cheap talk and (right) without cheap talk.
The dots represent the average best response percentages of the player types and the lines
are error bars.The error bars reflect 95% confident intervals.
These percentages were good. However, we wanted to know the reason aFP did not
play the best response strategy against its opponent in all rounds. When cheap talk was
permitted, most of the time the humans acted according to aFPs suggestions which were
typically the pure one-shot Nash equilibria of the game (when such an equilibrium existed).
In some rounds (four on average per game), aFP did not communicate with its opponents
because there was no pure one-shot Nash equilibria. As a result, the human player chose
something different from the NE solution, such that aFP did not get the best response
solutions. Without cheap talk, it was slightly harder for the humans to infer aFP’s behavior.
In addition, the structure of the games contributed to aFP’s failure to achieve best response
actions. In the unfair game, the game structure gave the human player a dominating action
which was an advantage for the human player. However, in limited instances (four per game
on average), the human did not play this dominating strategy though aFP anticipated that it
would (due to human inconsistency or a lack of data about the player so far). In the mixed
game, a lot of the games that aFP did not get the best response action were cyclic. These
games did not have a pure one-shot NE solution. On average, there were seven rounds in
the mixed games in which aFP did not play the best response action in mixed game. Out of
these rounds, four of them were cyclic type (there are seven rounds drawn from this payoff
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Figure 6.3: Tukey pairwise comparisons showing the average percentage of rounds in which
the players played a best response when paired with people over all games and conditions.
The dots represent the average best response percentages of the player types and the lines
are error bars. The error bars reflect 95% confident intervals.

Figure 6.4: aFP’s best response percentage through 50 rounds in self-play (left) in unfair
game and (right) in mixed game.
family in the mixed game), two games with a dominating action the human player did not
play, and once in a while a human played some other unpredicted action.
These results confirm our hypothesis about aFP. The generalized algorithm did
converge to a best response when playing with people despite the unpredictability of human
behavior. More importantly, we observed a human tendency in IGs: they tend to aim for short
term payoffs (e.g., one-shot NE), rather than more complex but more profitable cooperative
actions, in more complex IGs (as opposed to RGs). This results gives insights into developing
future algorithms for complex environments in the future.
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Figure 6.5: Average payoffs as a percentage of the NBS over both game (Left) with cheap
talk and (Right) without cheap talk. The error bars show the standard errors.

6.2

Cooperation between Aug-S# and Humans in IGs

In RGs, prior work has shown that S# learns to cooperate with people and other algorithms
that are inclined to cooperate [5], with cooperation rates being substantially higher when
cheap talk is possible. In this section, we consider whether Aug-S# is also able to learn to
cooperate with people in IGs with and without the possibility of cheap talk (Property P6). In
this chapter, we do this by considering the payoffs (as a percent of the NBS value) achieved
by the various player types in the user study.
The results from the user study are summarized in Figure 6.5. We ran a three-way
ANOVA analysis to test the significance of our findings. Our independent variables were
the (i) type of player (Human, aFP, Aug-S#), (ii) game (Unfair, Mixed), and (iii) cheap
talk (yes, no). The ANOVA test was used to determine the effect of these independent
variables on players’ payoff as a percentage of NBS (NBS percentage). The test showed main
effects for two of these variables: type of player (F (2, 108) = 3.45, p = 0.035) and cheap talk
(F (1, 108) = 18.88, p < 0.001). The interaction between these two independent variables
(F (2, 108) = 12.88, p < 0.001) also had significant effect on the dependent variable.
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Given the differences in the results with and without cheap talk, we discuss these two
cases separately.
6.2.1

With Cheap Talk

Figure 6.5(left) presents the differences between the algorithms’ NBS percentages with cheap
talk. The plot shows that both Human and Aug-S# NBS percentages were higher than
that of aFP. These values were similar between Aug-S# and Human. However, the Tukey
pair-wise comparison test pointed out that the differences were not statistically significant
(p = 0.195 for Human and aFP, p = 0.167 for Aug-S# and aFP). This result did not align
with our expectation. This may be due to outliers, insufficient data points to discover the
effect given its size, or the lack of an effect.
To better understand the results of the statistical analysis which determined the
significance of the differences, we broke down the data of each interaction. Figure 6.6 gives
a breakdown of each interaction in the study when cheap talk was permitted. We use the
average payoffs of aFP in self-play (the myopic score) as the base-line for the comparison. If
both players’ NBS percentage were a lot higher than aFP’s NBS percentages, we considered
the interaction cooperative. If one player has a significantly higher NBS percentage than that
of aFP while the other play’s NBS percentage value was far below that of aFP, we viewed
the interaction as having resulted in the one player exploiting the other. The rest of the
interactions were categorized as non-cooperative.
In the unfair game in which Aug-S# interacted with peopel, the majority (8 out of
12) of the interactions between Aug-S# and people were cooperative. In addition, Aug-S#’s
NBS percentage in these cooperative interactions are quite high. However, the payoffs of
Aug-S# in Pairings 2 and 9 (the two games in which Aug-S# was exploited by people),
Aug-S#’s NBS percentages are very low. We looked into each round of these two specific
interactions to learn more about these results. In Pairing 2, the human player cooperated
with Aug-S# in early rounds before deciding that Aug-S# had more payoffs than he/she did
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Figure 6.6: Payoffs for individual interactions when cheap talk was permitted.
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(without actually knowing the true payoffs). The humans subsequent reaction caused Aug-S#
to punish him or her. They then cooperated again and repeated the same process. Until
round 42 where they just retaliate against each other for the rest of the game. In Pairing 8,
Aug-S#’s punishment really hindered both players. Once again, the human player paid more
attention to the ratio of giving and receiving of the rounds instead of the actual total payoffs.
In this specific game, it seemed like the human player kept wanting to receive a higher payoff,
which caused Aug-S# to retaliate when the solution was not what it expected. In both cases,
this might not happen if the human player would have had more precise information about
payoffs. Aug-S# also might have had too high of a propensity to punish. In some instances,
the human players suggested to cooperate but Aug-S# continued punishing for several more
rounds.
In the mixed game, Aug-S# had a harder time establishing cooperative relationships
with people on average. Only half of the interactions were cooperative overall. For example,
in the Pairing 4 between Aug-S# and human, the human player did not send a single message.
This player completely used Aug-S#’s message to exploit the algorithm. Aug-S did punish its
opponent. Hence, neither of them received good payoffs. For the non-cooperative interactions,
the scenarios were the same as those in the unfair game. Both Aug-S# and the human would
cooperate for several rounds, then the human player decided that he or she did not receive
enough. They deviated from the solution Aug-S# proposed, leading Aug-S# to punish them.
This kept repeating. In some cases, the human subjects tried to cooperate more with Aug-S#
toward the end of the game. Nevertheless, it was too late to repair the damage. Despite
of the challenge Aug-S# had, we could not explain why Aug-S# could not cooperate well
with humans in the mixed game while all the human-human pairings achieved cooperative
interactions in the same game.
Overall, across both games, aFP did not have a single cooperative interaction playing
against human. On the hand, Aug-S# performed decently well when paired with many
of the human players. The algorithm cooperated with its partner in the majority of cases.
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In most non-cooperative interactions, Aug-S# did try to gain a better hand or showed a
non-cooperative behavior through punishment. Potentially Aug-S# was either too inclined to
punish its partner or it failed to properly convey that cooperation would be most beneficial
to the human player.
6.2.2

Without Cheap Talk

In Figure 6.5(right), we observe that the average NBS percentage of humans and aFP were
the same while the average NBS percentage of Aug-S# was substantially below the others.
Tukey pairwise comparisons show that the difference between both the performance Humans
and Aug-S# (p < 0.021) and aFP and Aug-S# (p < 0.001) are statistically significant. Thus,
unlike prior results show in RGs [5], Aug-S# was substantially less successful at interacting
with people in IGs than people (and aFP) are in interacting with people.
One possible explanation for this difference is that Aug-S# fails to account for changes
in human behavior as the complexity of the scenario increases when they are unable to
communicate with their partner. Time-varying game structures are likely perceived as more
complex interactions than interactions that repeat the same scenario over and over. Given the
uncertainty and greater difficulty in reasoning in these scenarios, human players potentially
could become more myopic (focusing on immediate payoffs) in these situations rather than
seeking long-term cooperation (as Aug-S# assumes they will).
The results shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 shed some insights into whether this hypothesis
might have some validity. In the unfair game, humans played a best response more often
without cheap talk (75% vs. 63%). However, there was very little difference in the mixed
game in human best-response rates between cheap talk conditions. Overall, the difference
was not statistically significant, indicating that, if this effect is indeed present, it is small
enough that we did not have sufficient power in this study to observe it.
As such, we are not certain what exactly causes Aug-S# to perform so poorly when
interacting with people without cheap talk in these games. Our current working hypothesis is
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that people fail to understand that, in the absence of cheap talk, Aug-S#’s punishments are
misunderstood, resulting in people believing the algorithm has no cohesive and cooperative
strategy.
We also looked at each individual interaction across both games. Figure 6.7 shows that
cooperation was hard to achieve when there no communication in IGs for all pairings. Both
human vs. human and Aug-S# vs. human pairings did much worse in term of cooperation
when comparing to the interactions with cheap talk. Only one interaction between humans is
categorized as cooperative. Looking at the data in Figure 6.7 for both games, we observe that
Aug-S#’s NBS percentages were really low. Humans seemed to do better when playing against
Aug-S# than when playing against aFP. In a substantial percentage of interactions, aFP
was able to exploit people. This makes sense because communication did not affect the way
aFP played. When observing the actions of Human and Aug-S# pairing, we perceived that
Aug-S# still tried to choose actions that would benefit both players in the long run. On the
other hand, humans played myopic actions that were most beneficial at the moment. However,
because there was no communication between players, it is more difficult to understand
what the players were thinking. However, it seemed like Aug-S# did followed its course and
retaliate when the other player did not cooperate.
We concluded that humans were more likely to follow their partner’s cooperative
strategy if the intent was clearly stated, which is done through communication. On the other
hand, without knowing the opponent’s intent, humans would move toward myopic behavior,
resulting in the poor performance by Aug-S# when cheap talk was not permitted.

6.3

Comparisons in Self Play

Despite Aug-S#’s struggles when interacting with humans without cheap talk, it is interesting
to compare results in self play. Which of the three players (Humans, Aug-S#, or aFP)
performs the best in self play in the mixed and unfair games used in the user study?
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Figure 6.7: Payoffs for individual interactions when cheap talk was not permitted.
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Figure 6.8: Average payoffs as NBS percentage in self play in unfair game (Left) with cheap
talk and (Right) without cheap talk. The error bars show the standard errors.

Figure 6.9: Average payoffs as NBS percentage in self play in mixed game (Left) with cheap
talk and (Right) without cheap talk. The error bars show the standard errors.

Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the performance of each kind of player in self play. Cheap
talk increased the average NBS percentage of both humans and Aug-S# in self play in these
games (albeit only to a small degree in the case of humans), but not the average of aFP.
Regardless, under each condition in each game, Aug-S# had the highest average, followed by
humans, and then aFP. However, we note that the difference between humans and Aug-S#
was not substantial in some cases.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work

While most work on learning in repeated interactions has focused on repeated games
(RGs) in which the players repeatedly engage in the same scenario, such interactions do not
commonly occur in reality. Thus, in this thesis, we have considered learning in repeated
interactions in which the scenario can change from round to round. We have called these
interactions IGs. Additionally, we have augmented two different algorithms (Fictitious Play [2]
and S# [5]) previously designed for RGs so that they can be used in IGs. We then evaluated
the resulting algorithms via simulation and user study in a variety of different IGs.
In simulation, our augmented algorithms maintain the same performance attributes
in IGs as those of the original algorithms in RGs. The empirical distribution of aFP’s actions
converge to a Nash Equilibrium and produced high percentages of best responses when
playing against itself in IGs. Aug-S# tends to minimize disappointment and cooperates with
a copy of itself. These results also fortified the finding in previous research on RGs [5], in
which Aug-S# consistently performs well in self play simulation. In our study, it performed,
on average, substantially better in self play than aFP and marginally better than humans
both with and without communication.
Through the user study and the statistical analysis, we could see that both Aug-S#
and aFP were trying to maintain the same performance attributes in IGs as those of the
original algorithms in RGs when interacting with people. aFP did converge to a best response
even with the humans’ unpredictable behavior. Its best response percentage in the user
study was similar to that of aFP in self play. aFP’s best response frequencies were also
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significantly higher than those of people and Aug-S#. Aug-S# did perform well against
humans when cheap talk was allowed. When both humans and Aug-S# can convey their
intention, the majority of the interactions between Aug-S# and humans were cooperative
when communication was possible. However, when playing without cheap talk, humans
appeared to have a hard time comprehending their opponents’ strategies, resulting in noncooperative outcomes. It is especially true when there are different components to the
strategies such as trigger strategies. Therefore, Aug-S# had a hard time playing against
humans compared to aFP and other humans.
In summary, our augmented algorithms did carry some of the performance attributes
as the original algorithms in RGs to IGs (Table 7.1). aFP had myopic behavior and converged
to a Nash Equilibrium in self play. Aug-S# tends to minimize disappointment, and, in
our user study, cooperated with others when they were wiling to. The only exception was
that when Aug-S# could not communicate its intent with its associates, it failed to produce
cooperative behavior with people at levels that people achieve with each other.
This discovery has caused us to reconsider an aspect of our algorithm for future study.
The trigger strategies experts in Aug-S# excessively punished their opponents when an
agreement was not reached. This led to missed opportunities in several occasions. This
happened in both cheap talk and no cheap talk environment. In future work, we want to avoid
this excessive behavior when there was no clear agreement. We hope to find out whether
humans will be able to interact with Aug-S# better when the algorithm is more lenient with
punishment.
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Algorithms

Expected Behavior
- The empirical distribution of
aFP
actions in self play converges to
a NE (P1)
- Learn to play best response
against people (P2)
Trigger Strategies - Offers are NE of the repeated
game and are near the Pareto
boundary (P3)
- Obtain low disappointment
Aug-S#
when associating with many
other algorithms (P4)
- Obtain payoffs near the NBS
value in self-play (P5)
- Achieve cooperative solutions
when playing with people who
are willing to cooperate (P6)

Our Results
- Largely confirmed for 2x2 IGs
(Chapter 4.3)
- Empirically confirmed in two
2x2 IGs (Chapter 6.1)
- Empirically confirmed across a
variety of 2x2 IGs (Chapter 4.2)
- Empirically confirmed in a set
of 2x2 IGs (Chapter 4.4)
- Payoffs are 90% of NBS in typical 2x2 IGs (Chapter 4.4)
- Mostly cooperates with cheap
talk, but unsuccessful without
cheap talk (Chapter 6.2)

Table 7.1: A summary of the performance and behavioral attributes of our augmented
algorithms in IGs as demonstrated by the results presented in this thesis.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire
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Figure A.1: Demographic Questionnaire
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Figure A.2: Post-Experiment Questionnaire
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Appendix B
The Games
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Figure B.1: The Unfair Game used in the user study. Each round consisted of a normal-form
game drawn from the Unfair payoff family [3].
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Figure B.2: The Mixed Game used in the user study. Each round consisted of a normal-form
game randomly drawn from among the Bruns’ seven payoff families [3].
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